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ENDING A NYSE TRADITION: THE 1975
UNRAVELING OF BROKERS’ FIXED COMMISSIONS
AND ITS LONG TERM IMPACT ON FINANCIAL
ADVERTISING
Janice M. Traflet
Bucknell University
Michael P. Coyne
Bucknell University

On May 1, 1975 (“Mayday”), the New York Stock Exchange jettisoned its 183
year old tradition of fixed rate broker commissions in favor of competitive,
negotiated rates. While many events, institutions, and individuals helped
inspire this controversial policy change, this paper focuses on the pivotal role
played by one Exchange insider, NYSE President Robert Haack. Despite his
original stalwart defense of fixed rates, Haack came to support rate
deregulation. Haack’s rationale for endorsing negotiated rates is evaluated as
well as how the new commission fee structure led to surprising changes in the
advertising landscape on Wall Street. This paper argues that Mayday
transformed the securities industry in more ways than anyone had envisioned
at the time.

In the late 1960s, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) still stubbornly clung to a
tradition instituted by the organization’s founders almost two centuries earlier: the
1 The
requirement that member brokers charge customers minimum commission rates.
NYSE Board of Governors adamantly upheld both the necessity and legitimacy of “fixing”
rates. However, a relatively short time later, in 1975, the Board unanimously agreed to
jettison fixed rates in favor of competitive, negotiated rates. The decision went into effect
2
on May 1, l975—”Mayday’ as Wall Street traders termed the momentous event.
What or who caused such a wholesale policy reversal? The Justice Department as well
as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had long disapproved of the price 1 31
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collusion, and for reasons that will be discussed had recently heightened pressure on the
NYSE to end the practice. Yet the impetus for rate deregi.ilation did not solely originate
from organizations outside the Exchange; it also emanated from within the institution.
The contributions and motivations of these internal reform advocates have not been well
understood. To rectify this, the first section of this paper wifi explore how and why one
pivotal NYSE member, President Robert Haack, decided to accelerate the path to Mayday,
despite his original stalwart defense of fixed rates. In the second section, the paper will
examine one unforeseen impact of rate deregulation—a dramatic rise in financial services
advertising—and we evaluate that legacy in light of Haack’s rationale for supporting
negotiated rates. The conclusion will discuss how negotiated commission rates changed
the landscape on Wall Street in more ways than either foes or advocates had envisioned.
The Stalwart Defender of Fixed Rates: Newly Inaugurated President Robert Haack

In April 1967, the NYSE Board of Governors unanimously chose Robert W. Haack to
be the NYSE’s new president, succeeding the retiring George Keith Funston. Haack’s
credentials were impressive: as president of the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) since 1964, he had improved its operational efficiencies, in part by encouraging
the adoption of an automated quotation system for over-the-counter stocks. Perhaps
especially appealing to the NYSE Board was Haack’s extensive experience at NASD dealing
with SEC regulators. The NYSE thus far had successfully resisted implementing the SEC’s
1965 “recommendation” to unfix rates,
3 but Board members feared the battle would
escalate. Consequently, they wanted a competent defender of fixed rates at the helm of the
4
NYSE.
Minimum commission rates were a source of great profits for member brokers, but
Robert Haack upheld the rule for less mercurial reasons-he believed that fixed rates
assured the vitality of the securities industry, and hence the country. Conversely, ending
minimum rates might unleash many hazards, such as ruinous competition among
brokers. Like many colleagues, Haack believed that the securities business was among the
few industries that were especially vulnerable to destructive competition, and therefore,
the NYSE was justified in price-fixing. Haack dismissed arguments that the rate rule
violated antitrust laws by discriminating against non-members. He concurred with
prevailing Exchange thought that the institution was essentially exempt from antitrust
laws because it was supervised by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Finally, in
Haack’s conservative opinion, it would be dangerous to terminate a practice that had been
in operation for almost two centuries.
5 Given Haack’s protective attitude toward fixed
rates, combined with his other qualities, it is little wonder that the Board viewed Haack as
the best choice to lead the NYSE at this juncture.
After assuming office in the fall of 1967, President Haack immediately faced a major
problem—a massive “paperwork crisis” caused by back-office inefficiencies in processing
a rising volume of securities transactions (not entirely unlike the recent backlogs of
derivatives trades). The NYSE Board responded by enacting several remedial measures,
such as abbreviated trading sessions to allow brokers time to catch up on the paperwork
1 32 and methods of improving automation. Haack supported these initiatives, but also
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vigorously endorsed a more controversial measure: ending the Board’s sponsorship of a
marketing program designed to attract new individuals to Wall Street. “Own Your Share
of American Business” had been a pet project of the NYSE since the early 1950s.
Nevertheless, Haack believed it was irresponsible of the NYSE to encourage more people
to come into the market at a time when Wall Street was having difficulty processing
existing customer transactions. Though unpopular for criticizing “Own Your Share:’
Haack nevertheless managed to convince sufficient Board members to terminate the
program. In retrospect, Haack’s wfflingness to challenge Own Your Share was a harbinger
of his later actions with respect to fixed rates. The episode also highlighted to Haack the
underlying inefficiencies at the NYSE, which fixed rates arguably fomented.
Concurrent with the paperwork crisis, Haack also immediately faced (as predicted) a
mounting attack on the organization’s commission structure. In the same month that
Haack was elected to office in April 1967, the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division
formally urged the NYSE to implement negotiated rates. Justice Department officials
argued that price-fixing would only be legal if it were necessary to assure the proper
functioning of the Exchange, which in their opinion it did not seem to be.
A recent sharp rise in institutional trading explains why the Justice Department was
now, and not earlier, attacking fixed rates with such gusto. In 1950, individual investors
accounted for 80 percent of trading, whereas by the mid 1 970s, institutional investors
6 Given that
accounted for 75 percent of trading-almost a complete reversal of positions.
brokers earned the same percentage amount on a transaction for 10,000 shares as they did
on 100 shares, brokers who processed large-block trades now were earning fat fees. The
NYSE defended these fees in part by noting that brokers passed “soft dollars” to
institutional clients to fund needed equity research. But to critics, the large commissions
seemed not only unnecessary, but also harmful; investors probably paid more for trades
than they would have if there was no minimum rate rule. It also seemed unfair for the
NYSE to prevent members from giving clients volume discounts if members wanted to do
so. Critics also noted that ifiegal reciprocity arrangements flourished under the fixed rate
system, as some greedy brokers used questionable means to secure the big deals and the
correspondingly large commissions. The practice of brokers splitting commissions,
known as “give-ups” generated abuses. Finally, foes of fixed rates criticized the Exchange’s
existing high minimum fee structure for protecting inefficient brokerage firms that might
7
not have been able to stay in business had their rates been set by the market.
Apparently ignoring these arguments for rate deregulation, Robert Haack continued
in 1968 and 1969 to vigorously defend the Exchange’s supposed right to set minimum
commission fees. Testifying at an SEC hearing on the subject in 1968, Haack warned that
negotiated rates could be “the undoing of the world’s principal securities market” and that
they would not only hurt Exchange members, but also the public. He was not precise
about exactly how competitive rates might inflict harm; his basic premise was that no one
could predict the outcome of deregulation, and thus it was a foolhardy risk. “This is not
an area where one experiments, tries a new system and returns to the old if the results are
unsatisfactory:’ Haack emphasized. He bristled at the Justice Department for acting upon
an unproven “theoretical concept” that price-fixing was inimical, without gathering
1 33
8
“supporting facts or economic data’
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In a remarkable change of attitude, however, by 1970, President Robert Haack had
come out forcefully for negotiated rates. In a way, it should not have been surprising that
Haack would eventually come to see the allure of competitive rates. As head of NASD, he
had prioritized improving efficiency, and as president of the NYSE during the paperwork
crisis, he had observed first-hand the need to likewise improve Exchange operations.
While additional computerization was one solution to the Exchange’s problems, Haack
also became convinced that another solution was unfixing rates, as he came to agree with
critics that large, uncompetitive fees hid bloat. Haack was a practical man, and less
conservative than his colleagues initially believed him to be: he was not going to defend
minimum fees simply because this was the way things were always done at the NYSE.
Moreover, Haack was a man of principle and he also came to decry fixed rates because he
believed this system had fomented a decline of ethics in the securities industry. Still, the
very public manner by which Haack announced his conversion stunned Wall Street.
Haack’s Reversal

On the evening of Tuesday, November 17, 1970, Haack delivered what The New York
Times would label the next day as “perhaps the most controversial speech ever given by a
Big Board president.”
9 More than one thousand members of the prestigious Economic
Club had come to a dinner expecting to hear Haack deliver a talk innocuously entitled,
“Competition and the Future of the NYSE.” It seemed as if this would be a standard spiel
about the virtues of the institution and the challenges lying ahead. Yet Haack immediately
tipped the audience that something unusual was about to come when he began with a
disclaimer: “Assertions and questions which I will pose are expressed to me as an
individual and do not necessarily represent the views of the board of governors’
°
1
Haack then proceeded to attack the Exchange’s fixed rate rule in unequivocal terms.
He derided fixed rates as the “single greatest reason” why the Exchange was losing business
to other, cheaper competitors like the so-called “third-market”.’
1 Besides this “market
fragmentation,” fixed rates had also resulted in “indiscreet excesses” at the NYSE due to
creative fee-splitting and had also fostered “inept management” at many brokerage firms.
Haack concluded that the NYSE, for its own sake, needed to discard “archaic and
anachronistic practices and proceduresY It needed to restructure itself “to meet the
changing times of our society’ He warned, “whatever vestiges of a private-club
atmosphere which remain at the New York Stock Exchange must be discarded.”
2
The governors of the NYSE, not just the Economic Club attendees, were shocked by
the candor and content of Haack’s speech. NYSE Chairman Bernard Lasker was enraged
in part because Lasker upheld fixed rates, and in part because Haack seemed to have
usurped the chairman’s role of dictating policy. The NYSE president’s endorsement of
negotiated rates seemed to indicate, despite Haack’s disavowal, that the entire Board was
rethinking its stance.
13
Haack did not back down or soften what he had said; rather, in later interviews, he
reiterated the crucial need to dismantle the existing commission fee structure.
14 Haack
was clearly unrepentant. Nor did he regret publicly airing his position, though it was
1 34 tradition at the NYSE for members to discuss their differences privately. Haack believed
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he needed to bring the issue to the surface in order to foster discussion of rate policy both
inside and outside of the NYSE. As Haack maintained, his open denouncement of fixed
5
rates was a “calculated risk” to trigger reform.’
While Lasker and other irate Board members unsuccessfully demanded Haack’s
immediate resignation, other members supported him. The pro-Haack, anti-fixed rate
contingency tended to be larger companies among the Exchange members, who stood to
gain business if they could be allowed to cut their rates below competitors’. These brokers
were confident that their operations were so tightly run that they could afford to lower
rates. Two of Haack’s biggest allies were Merrill Lynch, the largest retail brokerage firm
at the time and Salomon Brothers, a major player in the wholesale block market. As the
New York Times predicted, Merrill Lynch and Salomon Brothers would “set the rates in a
negotiated system’ so they had little to fear and much to gain by the unfixing of
6
commission fees.’
In the ensuing months after Haack’s bombshell speech, several brokerage houses,
including the once well-regarded McDonnell & Company, went bankrupt. The string of
failures reinforced Haack’s point that the comfort zone provided by fixed rates had
allowed too many brokerage houses to become careless in their operations. Making
matters worse, the failures were often accompanied by scandals; some firms had
misappropriated customers’ cash and securities in desperate efforts to remain solvent.
Haack’s observation that ethics on the Street were unraveling seemed prescient.
Still, however, the NYSE Board resisted capitulating on the rate issue. Although the
Exchange membership in April 1971 agreed, by a relatively narrow vote, to allow
negotiated rates on the portion of orders over $500,000, the NYSE still maintained the
7 Haack’s speech opened a dialogue on the
right to set minimum rates on most trades.’
commission fee structure, but the internal advocates of negotiated rates were still in the
minority at the NYSE. When Haack retired in the summer of 1972, the principle of fixed
rates remained intact. Yet Haack had dealt a major blow to the legitimacy of the practice.
Moreover, the fact that the NYSE President opposed fixed rates encouraged the SEC and
Justice Department to keep pursuing the issue. Fixed rates did not collapse while Haack
led the NYSE, but they would fall soon after his departure.
Mayday Approaches

Increasingly impatient, SEC officials in September 1973 demanded that fixed
commission rates be eliminated, and this time, they gave a deadline: May 1, 1975. Adding
weight to that mandate, Congress included in the 1975 amendments to the Securities Act
a provision requiring the NYSE to eliminate fixed commission rates, again by the May 1
deadline. As the NYSE Board of Governors realized, it was almost impossible to challenge
Congress on the rate issue-the only way to do so would be on Constitutional grounds, and
8 The time had come to unfix rates.
that was highly unlikely to work.’
Morgan Stanley chairman Robert Baldwin, a former Navy lieutenant, ominously
labeled the coming deregulation as Mayday—the international distress call. As the
deadline grew closer, another broker elaborated on the Mayday analogy, warning SEC
commissioners: “Mayday is a great holiday in Russia. and Russia has said there is no need 1 35
. .
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to fight democracy. It wifi burn itself out. Well, Commissioners, you have the candle and
the matches, and it will be a short fuse.”
9 As such warnings reflected, some on Wall Street
seemed to fear that without artificially set commission levels, the NYSE could crumble, to
the detriment of the entire country. Morgan Stanley’s Robert Baldwin, while pessimistic
about Mayday, nevertheless was less extreme in his forecast of the results: he predicted
that rate deregulation would cause the failure of between 150 to 200 investment banks.
°
2
By this point, deregulation was essentially a fait accompli, since the SEC had ordered
it. Technically, however, the NYSE Board of Governors needed to endorse the measure to
make it official. This required a majority vote among the twenty-one board members.
While an early vote had yielded a ten to ten split with one abstention, eventually, in 1975,
the NYSE Board of Governors decided to unanimously endorse negotiated rates. The
unanimity masked their deep ambivalence about unfixing rates, yet the governors
understood that they could not stop deregulation and therefore, for public relations
purposes, they decided it would look better if the NYSE seemed to be welcoming the
’
2
change.
Contrary to fears, Mayday led to no major long-term disruptions of the securities
industry. While approximately one hundred investment banks did fail, the lean, efficient
firms that survived went on to flourish in the deregulated environment.
22 A decade
afterwards, NYSE chairman John J. Phelan hailed Mayday as “the best thing that ever
happened for the industry:’
23 Indeed, the benefits of rate deregulation were many-among
them, tumbling commission fees, a decline in market fragmentation, and the emergence
of discount brokerage services like Charles Schwab. In an interview in 1988, Robert Haack
looked back on his 1970 speech advocating negotiated commission rates and commented,
“it still reads pretty good, if I may make a conceited statement.” As President of the NYSE
during a troubled time, Haack admitted he “created a few nonfans” with his controversial
positions, particularly because of his stance on rates. Yet he concluded, “but I am
immodest enough to think I didn’t lose any respect in the process:’
24 Indeed, in
retrospect, rate deregulation helped sharpen the NYSEs competitive edge, and it also
restored vitality to the industry as a whole.
The Unforeseen Impact of Mayday 1975: A Rise in Financial Advertising
Another important, but not well-noted, change engendered by rate deregulation was a
sharp increase in the amount of advertising conducted by brokerage firms—both
discount and full-service. It made sense that in a more competitive environment, with
negotiated rates, brokerage houses would now have a greater need to advertise themselves
and their new fee structures. Yet the decision whether or not to advertise was not
necessarily a rational one. Historically, NYSE members resisted advertising their services,
even when the Board, through the Own Your Share marketing campaign, encouraged
them to do so. Faced with the decision to advertise or suffer from a dearth of business,
many firms had chosen, seemingly against their own interests, the latter.
Impeding the widespread use of financial advertising was a deep-seated bias on Wall
Street: since the Exchange’s earliest days, self-promotion was widely viewed by members
1 36 as déclassé, unbefitting gentleman brokers.
25 The securities industry was not alone in this
Essays in Economic & Business History

—

Vol XXV, 2007

critical assessment of advertising: other professions, especially the medical, legal, and
accounting fields, believed advertising was improper, and in the late nineteenth century,
they established codes of conduct banning almost all advertising and soliciting. According
to the rationale, if a professional rendered high quality services, paid advertising would be
unnecessary, as positive word-of-mouth alone would generate sufficient business.
Allegedly, only the “charlatans” needed to advertise.
The disapproving attitude toward professional advertising persisted well into the
twentieth century, although the NYSE formally removed its ban in the 1940s.
Nevertheless, when Charles Merrifi, the founder of Merrill Lynch, flaunted tradition and
began to advertise to the middle class after World War II, many Exchange members were
initially appalled. While the institution of the Own Your Share campaign sanctioned
advertising (given that the NYSE Board formally endorsed the program), at the
campaign’s end in 1967 the majority of NYSE member firms were still not committed to
investing significantly in advertising.
How and why, then, did Mayday change this antipathy to marketing? As already noted,
brokers now needed to communicate their new rates, but there was another compelling
reason why they suddenly became more inclined to act in their own best interests: all
professional advertising in the late 1 970s became legitimate, in large part due to a critical
1977 Supreme Court decision.
In Bates v. State Bar ofArizona, the Court ruled that professional bans on advertising
and personal solicitation violated free speech. Forced to reform, professional societies like
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants immediately relaxed their rules
promotions. Perhaps more than revisions in rules and laws was an
regarding member 26
accompanying revision in attitudes; advertising increasingly became perceived as an
acceptable professional practice, not as a sign of weakness or guile.
Therefore, as the first discount brokerage firms began to emerge in the mid 1970s, the
environment was especially conducive for advertising and marketing. Just a few years
earlier, former NYSE President Robert Haack had endured much criticism for terminating
the Own Your Share campaign. Yet, ironically, by encouraging rate deregulation, Haack
unwittingly inspired a whole new age of financial advertising.
For ethical reasons, Haack came to embrace negotiated rates. Personally, he had
nothing to gain by siding with the SEC and Justice Department in the controversy, but he
genuinely believed that competitive rates would improve the character of Wall Street.
While the unfixing of rates did remove many of the problems then besotting the NYSE,
the question arises as to whether the rise in financial advertising inspired by Mayday did
not generate a new host of ethical problems in the form of disingenuous advertising.
After 1975, did the quality of advertising deteriorate as the quantity increased? As
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer and other critics have noted, many recent financial
advertisements have glamorized the stock market and exaggerated the upside potential of
equity investing. For instance, airing in 1999, at the height of the “dot.com bubble’ a
television commercial sponsored by Morgan Stanley’s Discover Brokerage unit featured a
fictitious tow truck driver named Al, whose tremendous profits purportedly allowed him
27 SEC chairman Arthur Levitt lambasted Discover
to purchase his own tropical island.
Brokerage for this allegedly irresponsible advertisement, and also reprimanded the NASD 1 37
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and the NYSE for tolerating firms making such exaggerated claims.
While such reprimands were justified in some respects, internal regulators in recent
years have not been entirely negligent in patrolling member advertisements. For example,
in the past decade, many brokerage firms have incurred fines for issuing misleading
advertising. However, some may argue that regulators should be chastised for not making
the amount of the fines sufficiently substantial to serve as a major deterrent. For instance,
for one improper advertisement, E*trade was fined only $90,000—hardly a major
punishment given the company’s revenue of $2.5 billion.
28 If an unethical advertisement
generates significant business for a firm, some brokers may conclude it is worth enduring
the risk of a small fine.
Of course, some brokerage firms do make ethically-sound decisions on their
advertisements and they seem to have been rewarded by the market for doing so. One of
the earliest entrants into the new field of discount brokerage services, Charles Schwab
Corporation is today the most successful and largest discount firm in the world. In the
United States alone, Schwab serves an estimated 7.5 million clients.
29 In no small part,
the success of Schwab was due to the company’s consistent and early adoption of quality
advertising and promotional activities. Embracing advertising with phenomenal returns,
Charles Schwab in the 1970s followed the path blazoned by Charles Merrill in the l950s.
Like Merrill, Schwab is careful to highlight in its advertisements the risks of investing, not
just the rewards. Therefore, the ethical character of Schwab’s past and present promotions
has tended to be high.
Trying to challenge Schwab’s supremacy, many new players have entered the discount
brokerage field. The emergence of these additional players helps account for the poor
quality of some advertisements. The more competition, the more some brokers feel they
need to advertise aggressively (and perhaps unethically) in order to garner business.
Desperate to compete in a glutted market, many brokerage firms also have further
deepened their commission rates. Some companies offer trades as low as $9.95—an
amount hard to imagine in 1975. Yet the staggering volume of trades in recent years,
combined with rapid advances in technology, have enabled firms to offer such low rates.
Taking advantage of the cheaper transaction fees, many investors have increased their
trading activity. While it is good that investors can make less costly trades and can “shop
around” for the best bargain, it is unclear whether the increased trading itself is a positive
development. Before Mayday 1975, more investors maintained a “buy and hold” strategy,
whereas today, a more short-term investing attitude has gained strength.
Conclusion
As suggested, the impact of Mayday 1975 has been mixed and far-flung. Certainly, in
the new era of monumental institutional investing, the continuation of fixed rates was
untenable. President Haack, though a pariah in many Wall Street circles for making his
bombshell speech, was nonetheless right to collaborate with the SEC and the Justice
Department to implement negotiated rates. The subsequent rise of discount brokerage
firms and the accompanying increase in advertising helped spread shareownership to the
1 38 masses. However, with the rise of popular investing indirectly, through institutions, and
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directly, by individuals, comes an increased duty for brokers to advertise responsibly.
Professional marketers like Charles Schwab will reap the benefits of taking the ethical high
road in their promotional efforts. In contrast, other brokers who embark upon an
ethically questionable advertising path perhaps may incur higher profits in the short term,
but will not be able to sustain their reputations or their profitability in the long term.
In his controversial 1970 speech, Haack had warned of the necessity of discarding
° While he was referring to the
3
“archaic and anachronistic practices and procedures’
fixed rate commission structure, his words could apply equally well to unethical
advertising practices. Those firms that wish to survive and flourish in the highly
competitive modern brokerage industry must learn to embrace high-quality advertising
that emphasizes the risks and not just the rewards of investing.
In conclusion, in fomenting change on a variety of fronts, Mayday 1975 indeed
constituted a revolution. Explaining the origin of that revolution, scholars Marshall
Blume, Jerry Siegel, and Dan Rottenburg have argued that “outside forces had compelled
’ Yet, as we have seen,
3
the New York Stock Exchange to adopt a fundamental change.”
certain internal forces at the NYSE also supported rate reform. \‘Vhile it is likely that rate
deregulation eventually would have occurred even without the support of minority
Exchange members like Robert Haack, it is nonetheless significant that in a time of crisis
on Wall Street, some NYSE leaders were willing to issue their own mayday and openly
admit that the NYSE needed help revising and updating at least one of the organization’s
ancient practices. In multiple ways, the Mayday Revolution made the once “private club”
of the NYSE more of a public institution, and, in this regard, the effects of Mayday still
reverberate.
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